Countercyclical energy and climate policy for the US by Nemet, G.F. et al.
  
 
 
  
Article type:  Opinion 
 
Article title:  Countercyclical energy and climate policy for the U.S.  
 
Authors: 
First author 
Gregory F. Nemet* 
La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
Nelson Institute Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE), University 
of Wisconsin-Madison 
nemet@wisc.edu 
Second author 
Arnulf Grubler 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and 
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University 
Third author 
Daniel M. Kammen 
Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley and 
Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley 
The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest. 
 
 
Abstract 
Continuation of the U.S.’s historical pattern addressing energy problems only in times of crisis is 
unlikely to catalyze a transition to an energy system with fewer adverse social impacts.  Instead, the 
U.S. needs to bolster support for energy innovation when the perceived urgency of energy-related 
problems appears to be receding.  Because of the lags involved in both the energy system and the 
climate system, decarbonizing the economy will require extraordinary persistence over decades.  
This need for sustained commitment is in contrast to the last several decades, which have been 
marked by volatility and cycles of boom and bust.  In contrast to the often-repeated phrase that one 
should ‘never let a good crisis go to waste,’ the U.S. needs to most actively foster energy innovation 
when aspects of energy and climate problems seem to be improving.  We describe the rationale for 
a “countercyclical” approach to energy and climate policy, which involves pre-commitment to a set 
of policies that go into effect once a set of trigger conditions are met. 
  
Introduction 
In addition to climate change, society faces an array of problems associated with current patterns of 
energy use, including energy poverty, local and regional air pollution, and international security 
issues.  Developing lasting solutions to these problems—that simultaneously meet the social 
objectives of being affordable, clean, and reliable—has proven difficult.  Even achieving consensus 
on what broad strategies to pursue has been elusive, in part because people value each of the 
various social objectives of an energy system differently.  Choosing among affordable, clean, and 
reliable typically involves difficult tradeoffs; implementing new policies creates winners and losers.  
Among this discord, one can still find a consensus among many of a need for a transition to a 
different, more modern, energy system, one in which the tradeoffs among competing social 
objectives are less severe1. 
 
THE NEED FOR A GOVERNMENT ROLE 
A transition to an energy system that would adequately satisfy these multiple objectives requires a 
substantial government role for several reasons.   First, multiple market failures affect the energy 
system2.  Water and air are public goods shared across property lines and international borders; they 
are of value to the rich and poor alike.  The dependence of our well being on energy means that 
sudden changes in energy access can lead to macro-economic shocks, such as recessions, and even 
to international conflicts.  Competition may not be feasible due to what economists refer to as 
“natural monopolies,” in which a single regulated entity is more efficient than competing providers.   
Further, the intrinsic role of innovation in an energy transition involves spillovers of knowledge from 
one firm to another, as well as from one country to another.  To keep incentives aligned with the 
multiple objectives, governments need to play a role in each of these areas; and to an extent, they 
do, at least partially.  Examples include, pollution regulations, patrolling of sea-lanes, the patent 
system, and importantly, the approach to funding and valuing the research enterprise. 
But even in the absence of market failures, a second set of reasons for government involvement may 
play an even more important role.  A broad set of studies makes clear that increasing returns are 
pervasive in energy systems.  Energy technologies exhibit massive economies of scale3; unit costs fall 
as output increases.  One can see this in the size of energy supply technologies, such as nuclear, coal, 
and hydroelectric plants at gigawatt scale4.  Unit costs also fall in the manufacturing of both energy 
supply and end-use technologies.  The largest solar PV manufacturing facilities produce several 
gigawatts of panels per year and individual battery manufacturing plants involve several billion 
dollars of investment to produce dozens of gigawatt-hours per year of capacity.  Transmission and 
distribution networks too have scale economies.  Moreover, load factors for them create network 
effects so that very large interconnected systems become more efficient by requiring less supply 
capacity than isolated small systems.  We also know that there are substantial learning-by-doing 
effects in energy system components, particularly in small modular systems that involve orders of 
magnitude more construction iterations than large ones5, 6.  Beyond individual learning effects, 
 studies show that learning—knowledge acquired through experience—flows between firms7, 
between technologies8, and between countries9, 10.  The outcome of this combination of mechanisms 
is a system in which increasing returns are pervasive.  Instead of a system in which diminishing 
returns tend to support competition and diversity, the energy system has aspects that support 
concentration and dominant designs.  Initial conditions loom large in determining outcomes and 
constrain the choices available to actors.  One can see path dependence at multiple scales: in the 
evolution of individual technologies11, 12, the development of the electric power system itself13, and 
even in modeling of climate change mitigation scenarios14.  Path dependence is especially important 
given the inherently uncertain and long-term aspects of the energy and earth systems discussed 
next.  The array of mechanisms discussed above that fall under the rubric of increasing returns are 
powerful forces that can generate gains for society in terms of less costly and more substantial 
climate change mitigation efforts.  But they also constrain choices.  Governments can play a role in 
designing institutions, enforcing rules, and creating incentives to preserve options that could 
become valuable in an inherently uncertain future. 
 
INERTIA IN ENERGY AND EARTH SYSTEMS 
In addition to multiple market failures, addressing energy problems involves challenges due to 
distinct characteristics of the energy system, particularly its inertia.  Foremost, capital stock in the 
energy sector lasts a long time.  Much of it requires large investments, which are difficult to increase 
incrementally, due to pervasive economies of scale. Up-front capital costs comprise large portions of 
total costs, variable costs are low, and technology is upgradeable.  As a result, substitution of new 
equipment for old is delayed; capital stock persists and is unlikely to be disposed of, even in the face 
of attractive substitutes15, 16.  Compare the 80-year old power plants, transmission lines, and 
pipelines of today’s U.S. energy system to: 10-year-old cars, 2-year-old phones, and 30-day 
pharmaceutical prescriptions.  The shorter lifetimes of the latter provide frequent opportunities for 
iteration, innovation, and adoption of novel components.  To be sure, the energy system has 
involved dramatic changes in the past 200 years, but the most fundamental changes have arrived 
slowly15, 17. 
These inertial aspects of the energy system are even more pronounced when one considers climate 
change.  Once emitted, CO2, and other GHGs such as N20, remain in the atmosphere on time scales 
of decades to centuries, i.e. the same order of magnitude or even longer than energy infrastructure 
turnover.  In contrast to these greenhouse gases, pollutants like particulates and SO2 mostly fall out 
of the atmosphere within weeks.  Decarbonizing the energy system to address climate change is an 
especially daunting challenge in that it involves both the slow turnover of energy infrastructure and 
the slow removal of atmospheric greenhouses gases by land and oceans. 
 
HISTORICAL VOLATILITY 
A key implication of these characteristics of both energy and earth systems is that a transition to a 
less ecologically damaging and more socially equitable energy system will require extraordinary 
persistence over decades.  Yet the history of energy policy, particularly in the U.S., reveals just the 
 opposite.  Over the last four decades, multiple disparate aspects of the U.S. energy system exhibit 
volatility: in prices, in policy intensity, in investment in R&D, and in technology deployment, and 
even in the amount of media attention devoted to energy and climate change (Figure 1)18-20.  These 
patterns do not fit with the nearly continuous growth over this period of the society that the U.S. 
energy system supports.   Similar cycles also emerge in survey data on U.S. concerns about climate 
change21.  In these cycles of interest and apathy, energy is at times a high national priority and then 
becomes a non-issue as other concerns take precedence.  If it were not for the adverse social 
impacts of energy use, most would prefer that energy stay in the background, as a service we take 
for granted and can rely upon so that we can get on with daily life.  But with climate change and 
other challenging problems to be addressed, the cycles of effort and indifference are damaging.  One 
outcome is periods of over-investment followed by periods of under-investment. Cycles of 5 to 10 
years, and often shorter, are out of sync with the time needed for innovation to progress, e.g. to 
train new researchers in universities who then develop experience so that they can play roles in 
driving innovations to market.  The longer, thirty-year, cycles we see in Figure 1 affect perceptions 
and longer term expectations that may have deeper effects on incentives.  Both short and long 
cycles are certainly out of sync with the 50 to 100 year cycles characteristic of transitions in the 
global energy system.  With inter-related business cycles and election cycles, long lags from 
investment decisions to payoffs may even amplify cycles.  Further, the emergence of competing 
social priorities from other areas—such as employment, health, competitiveness, and national 
security—provides external contributions to volatility in energy.   
 
Figure 1. Time series of selected aspects of the U.S. energy system 1970-2014. 
Consider also that, in some situations, volatility is an inevitable effect of efforts to address energy 
and climate problems.  At least part of the decline in several indicators in the first half of the 1980s 
 in Figure 1 is attributable to an array of policies and other responses to the energy crises in the 
1970s.  For example, the doubling of miles-per-gallon of U.S. passenger vehicles from 1975 to 1985 
contributed directly to the fall in oil imports (panel C) and oil prices (panel A).  It likely also played an 
indirect role in the subsequent fading of public interest in energy (panel F) and decline in federal 
R&D appropriations in (panel D).  Note also that miles-per-gallon barely changed for the next 20 
years despite continued improvements in vehicle efficiency22.  This scenario is a classic illustration of 
Downs’ “issue-attention cycle,” in which efforts to respond to crises are sometimes difficult to 
sustain politically in part due to initial success removing a sense of urgency.  In short, policies to 
address the 1970s energy “crises” contributed to the subsequent bust23.  One can also imagine a 
quite similar outcome of efforts to improve energy efficiency and deploy low-carbon energy sources 
in response to climate change; fossil fuel prices will fall removing at least part of the motivation for 
pursuing climate policy, affordability. 
VOLATILITY WEAKENS INCENTIVES AND SLOWS INNOVATION  
In addition to simply retarding progress, volatility is problematic in two additional, critical ways.  
First, making a transition to a new energy system requires innovation, which both depends on, and 
must feed into further investment.  Because payoffs to energy investments often take years to 
decades to accrue, investment depends on expectations—not in the next month or quarter, but on 
the 5 to 10-years or more over which large infrastructure or manufacturing facilities will pay off.  
Expectations are fragile—in part due to historical experience with booms and busts24.  Even if we 
see over-investment during the peak years of booms, the net effect over long time periods is likely 
substantial under-investment25.  This effect extends across the innovation lifecycle, including 
technology deployment and back to the supply of trained scientists and engineers at the crucial 
stage at which they select their field of study26. 
A second fundamental challenge has to do with the nature of innovation, which depends on the 
creation and use of new knowledge.  While new knowledge can be created in many ways—via 
research, learning-by-doing, and serendipitous spillovers—it can also be lost27.  Knowledge 
depreciates and is destroyed in busts—in part due to technological obsolescence and in part due to 
the tacit aspect of much of the knowledge created in booms7.  The urgency of exploiting booms may 
even exacerbate knowledge destruction, with weak incentives to codify tacit knowledge during the 
scramble to scale up during a boom11.  Moreover, knowledge is lost during cycles of hiring and firing, 
with little time or incentive to invest in training.  When booms fade and layoffs increase, know-how 
is lost as workers, technicians, and entrepreneurs flee to seek opportunities in other sectors.  In 
energy, particularly but not exclusively in the U.S., we’ve seen this happen again and again28.  Note 
that many of these aspects are considerably more stable in other countries, e.g. R&D investment in 
Japan and renewables support in Germany.  However, the rest of the world is not immune to what 
may appear to be peculiar and even perverse aspects of the U. S. energy system. In areas ranging 
from fusion energy, to solar energy, to natural gas, to an integrated view of nuclear energy science, 
engineering and waste management, one can see clear evidence of the disproportionate role of the 
 U.S. as an energy consumer and even more disproportionate role as a source and market for new 
energy technologies29. 
TOWARD A COUNTERCYCLICAL ENERGY POLICY 
These characteristics of the carbon cycle, the energy system, and of innovation systems require a 
sustained commitment to incentives for investments in innovation.  These incentives must be 
aligned, balanced, credible, and durable28, 30, which is a particular challenge in periods where general 
public and policy interests in energy wane due to competing concerns or complacency on energy 
issues. Thus we argue for a countercyclical approach to energy and climate policy, much as the U.S. 
does now for monetary and fiscal policy.  The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and related 
commitments by International Energy Agency member states, are the closest examples we have 
within energy31; prepare in good times for the bad times.   
Multiple factors support the rationale for governments to be more active during the lulls in energy 
problems, that is, when a crisis seems most distant.  For example, the past has shown that the 
private sector will invest in new technology, in efficiency, and in new sources when prices are high 
and when other factors, such as policy and public sentiment, are aligned.  But the private sector has 
also shown tremendous agility in disinvesting in innovation when prices fall; firms have disincentives 
to sustain investments in alternatives, including employing those with specialized knowledge, when 
the outlook for the legacy system is benign18.  Sustaining knowledge creation and required 
investments is crucial, as these lull periods typically last several years.  Similarly, the public has 
tended to demand better environmental protection when it feels its health or important ecosystems 
are threatened, which is most pronounced in the wake of regulatory failures and when “focusing 
events” catalyze concern and action32.  Temporary improvement, or even gradual deterioration in 
environmental quality, may not provide sufficient motivation to assemble necessary political 
coalitions.  Yet, the long-lived aspects of the related systems require persistent progress under 
varying degrees of urgency.  Indeed in energy, as nearly every U.S. President over the past 40 years 
has learned, inertia, as well as the truly global aspects of the system, severely constrain the avenues 
available for governments to effectively address energy-related crises in the short term. 
We define countercyclical policies as having two components: 1) a set of trigger mechanisms in place 
ahead of time, and 2) a set of policies that would be put in place once the trigger conditions are met.  
Both would ultimately need to be quite specific in order for them to have meaningful affects on 
incentives, and ultimately on the energy and climate systems.  This paper is intended primarily to lay 
out the rationale and structure for this type of approach.  Still, some examples exist and would help 
clarify what is involved in these two policy components. 
First, a countercyclical policy would need to have rules, or guidelines, in place ahead of time to be 
implemented once conditions are met.  For example, one could use oil price declines as a trigger for 
a set of policies.  Just to illustrate, an arbitrary rule could be that a counter cyclical period is 
triggered if the average annual oil price is below the levels of the past 3-6 years.  Figure 2 shows 
there are 3 periods that meet this rule: 1977-78, 1984-1999, and 2012-14.  The levels shown in gray 
in these periods are simply the oil price at the beginning of the period and perhaps provide an 
indication of the stringency of policies needed to address incentives.  Note that in this case the rule 
would not trigger policies in 2000-04, even though prices were historically low then, because prices 
 were rising.  The specifics of the trigger rules would need to be worked out, but the main point is 
that having them in place before the periods is crucial given the low political salience during these 
periods. 
 
Figure 2. Example of periods when conditions trigger countercyclical policies. 
 
Second, the countercyclical approach needs specific policies to go into place once the trigger 
conditions are met.  This might involve a single important policy mechanism, or could involve a 
bundle of policies intended to address a broad set of sectors or related incentive problems.  One can 
imagine a number of policies that would be especially appropriate during countercyclical trigger 
periods, that is, when incentives are most needed.  For example, one could implement a gasoline tax 
that rises as the gas price falls, which would have the effects of smoothing out after-tax prices.   
As another example: low natural gas prices have many benefits, but undermine incentives for a 
broad set of low-carbon technologies such as nuclear power, energy efficiency, and renewables.  
Countercyclical conditions triggered by low natural gas prices could be offset with incentives for 
these other technologies.  The U.S. currently supports some of these other technologies with a 
production tax credit (PTC) of $22/MWh.  This tax credit is in place for 18 months at a time, but is 
often left to expire and remain at zero for many months until is reauthorized.  A countercyclical 
approach would be to pre-set the value of the PTC so that it inversely tracks the price of natural gas.   
On R&D spending, guidelines might implement an increase in energy R&D once the triggers are met.  
This would offset likely declines in private R&D and in any case would help smooth investment in 
new knowledge, which can improve its value over time.  It might even be appropriate to have 
secondary policies, that is, policies that are made more stringent when other policies weaken.  Such 
a policy could be investment in R&D when carbon prices get low enough to trigger countercyclical 
conditions33.  
Given the lengthy time periods involved, some flexibility in the policies to be implemented would 
surely be helpful.  But an essential aspect of the countercyclical approach is pre-commitment, that 
is, policy makers do not have complete discretion over whether to implement these policies once 
trigger conditions are met. 
 A countercyclical approach would provide several benefits.  In addition to sustaining knowledge 
creation and innovation, it would build reserves, resilience, and buffer capacity against inevitable 
future shocks.  It would build long-term credibility in government targets, create a more stable 
policy environment, and hence would render a valuable public good to markets; it would enhance, 
rather than undermine, the predictability of future conditions.  A countercyclical approach is also 
likely to be less expensive because governments need not compete with the private sector for 
resources, capital, and especially talented scientists and engineers, during these slack periods.  One 
need not worry about governments crowding out private investment when the private sector is 
disinvesting.  Moreover, governments borrow at much lower rates than does the private sector, 
allowing them to take a longer-term view on risky investment. 
The policy alternative to which we are primarily comparing our countercyclical approach is the status 
quo. The status quo in the U.S. is, and has been, quite similar to the prototypical policy response in 
the Downs article we cite above: “alarmed discovery” of the problem, followed by “enthusiastic 
response,” and “gradual decline.”  Another policy alternative would be to target a commitment to a 
“stable” set of policies that are sustained over many years.  For example, a carbon price that reflects 
the social costs of carbon and rises at a social discount rate.  That type of policy would be preferable 
to the status quo.  But there are reasons a “stable” policy approach would be less preferable than a 
countercyclical approach: it would not be able to respond to new information about the problem; it 
would not be able to take advantage of inexpensive resources available during lulls; and it would not 
respond to the incentives to backtrack on policy commitments during lulls in public interest, a 
pattern we have seen repeatedly24.  
To be sure, such a strategy would encounter challenges, most prominently in its political feasibility.  
Government efforts would need to be most active when public salience of energy problems is low.  
But, in the longer-term, the advantages of more substantively addressing fundamental climate and 
energy challenges are large.  The political challenges need not be insurmountable given the 
magnitude of benefits, as shown by other countries’ approaches to energy and even those by the 
U.S. in diverse areas of social concern, such as social security, highways, and fiscal policy.  Familiarity 
with the efforts to address these problems can itself facilitate support34. In short, we need 
government most when prices are low, when a crisis seems furthest away, when energy problems 
seem to be getting better, and when competing social priorities, such as health, education, and the 
economy, demand attention.  
Conclusion 
We may be on the cusp of just such a regime of benign energy challenges in the U.S.  Oil prices are 
down 50% from their peak; many project natural gas prices to stay low for 10-20 years; imports of oil 
have declined for several years and discussion of energy independence is widespread.  Indeed many 
see the recent emergence of plentiful domestic fossil fuel production as a linchpin of a return to 
international competitiveness for energy intensive sectors of the U.S. economy.  Similarly, 
greenhouse gas emissions have fallen in part due to substituting gas for coal, which will also improve 
local air quality and associated health impacts.   Even global temperature rise appears to have 
slowed over the past 15 years, if for not well-understood and likely temporary reasons35. In short, 
several aspects of energy problems give the appearance of improving for the first time in 30 years. If 
 this current outlook remains in place long enough to dampen perceptions about the urgency of 
energy problems, this juncture is exactly when we need to more seriously address energy problems, 
which are unavoidably long-term.  We need energy policy most not when there is a crisis, but when 
things appear to be getting better and the opportunities for sound planning and long-term vision are 
in greatest supply.  A counter cyclical energy policy—including a pre-commitment to a set of policies 
once trigger conditions are met—would provide a basis for institutionalizing far-sightedness that is 
robust to the vagaries of near term social priorities. 
 
Notes 
No notes. 
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Figure 1. Time series of selected aspects of the U.S. energy system 1970-2015: (A) crude oil prices36, 
(B) natural gas prices37, (C) crude oil imports38, (D) federal energy R&D investment39, (E) investment 
in new wind power40, and (F) “energy”41 and “climate” articles in the media42.  
 
Figure 2. Example of periods when conditions trigger countercyclical policies. 
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